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HUMILITY AND THE TRANSCENDENT
Vance G. Morgan

Over the past decade, several authors have attempted to define humility as
a "secular" virtue that avoids any reliance on "religious" or transcendent
metaphysical frameworks. Tn this article I argue that these attempts to
define humility in cognitive and self-evaluative terms are largely misconceived. I use the work of Iris Murdoch and Simone Wei! to argue that
humility cannot be accounted for on exclusively naturalistic assumptions
and to suggest ways in which transcendence might be reintroduced into the
discussion of humility without immediately adopting the "religious" framework that contemporary work in humility is so critical of.

The humble man, because he sees himself as nothing, can see other things as thL1f are.
-Iris Murdoch l
Without humility, all the virtues are finite. Only humility makes them infinite.
-Simone WeiF
Over the past decade, a number of discussions of humility has appeared in
the philosophicalliterature. 3 On the face of it this seems odd, given that the
popular conception of humility includes low self-esteem and underestimation (either intentional or unintentional) of one's value and worth. It is difficult to see how such a trait could be a virtue or a valuable disposition to
develop and nurture, since having a low opinion of oneself carries no obvious benefit to oneself or society at large. Indeed, such a trait would seem to
facilitate contemptuous treatment and dismissal at the hands of others. As
Stephen Hare writes, "humility thus understood seems at best a saving
grace of the mediocre and at worst an excuse for passivity towards human
wrongs. "4
Why, then, has humility traditionally been considered a virtue, imagined by some to be one of the greatest and most important virtues of all?
One answer is that humility is a distinctively Christian virtue, one that
makes sense primarily within the framework of Christian metaphysics.
Norvin Richards describes this framework as follows:
This is a tradition according to which nothing that is good about you
is to your own personal credit: such things are only the particular
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gifts God chose to give you, for which you should be grateful but of
which you cannot properly be proud. On the other hand, everything
that is bad about you is your own fault, a way in which you personally have failed. If so, to have a high opinion of yourself would always
be to overestimate yourself and to take credit where none was due.
Properly humble individuals would take a dim view of themselves
instead, because that would be the accurate view, the view which did
not overestimate. Humility turns out to be a matter of having oneself
in proper perspective; the idea that this perspective must be depressing rests on the tradition's further claims about the nature of human
beings and their place in the universe.'
For many, perhaps most, this framework is controversial and by no means
self-evident. Indeed, virtually all of the recent literature on humility rejects
these metaphysical assumptions out of hand. Once these assumptions are
jettisoned, either humility must be rejected as a virtue or it must be "secularized" so as to remove any trace of reliance on assumptions that G. F.
Schueler describes as "utterly implausible" and likely to "find very few
takers generally."6
My aim in this paper is to show that although the recent work on humility has been fruitful in several important ways, its attempt to define humility in cognitive and self-evaluative terms is largely misconceived. By
removing from humility any meaningful reference to the transcendent, the
core disposition that makes humility "one of the most difficult and central
of all virtues'" is lost. After an investigation of important features of the
recent literature on humility, I use the thought of Iris Murdoch and Simone
Weil to construct an understanding of humility that draws its energy from
what George Schlesinger calls" other-directedness ... the ultimate source
of all other characteristics that involve an impartial concern for worthy
ideals and causes, and that require sympathy for the well-being of others.'"
1.

Humility as a secular virtue . .. becomes an excellence of character within
anyone's reach bllt one that is especially fitting to the most accomplished and
admired persons.
- Stephen Hare 9
Much of the recent work on humility begins by taking note of a logical puzzle that arises if one accepts the common definition of humility as "having a
low estimate of oneself." If this definition is correct, in what sense is humility a virtue? On the hypothesis that there are persons who deserve legitimate
merit and praise for their character and actions, for such persons to have a
"low estimate" of themselves would seem to either require ignorance or a
deliberate falsification of the truth. Neither of these alternatives is compelling. Unless one believes that no one ever truly deserves merit and
praise, it is difficult to see how humility can logically be a desirable trait,
since neither ignorance nor deliberate falsehood are good things.
Tn "The Virtues of Ignorance," Julia Driver addresses the above puzzle
by arguing that there is "a class of virtues which involve ignorance in an
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essential way" and proposes that modesty I humility is a paradigmatic case
of such virtues. 'o Her underestimation account (UA) of modesty states that
"the modest person underestimates his self-worth. If he speaks, then he
understates the truth, but he does so unknowingly."" In other words,
"modesty can be characterized as a dogmatic disposition to underestimation of self-worth."12 In a later discussion, Driver suggests that this "dogmatic disposition" arises because the modest person is one who "does not
spend a lot of time ranking, who does feel the need to do so, and thus
remains ignorant to the full extent of self-worth (to a limited extent)."'3
Even though the notion of "virtues of ignorance" strikes many as oxymoronic, Driver suggests that there are a number of valuable psychological
states and instrumental goods that virtues such as modesty generate. '4
Furthermore, insistence at the start that no virtue can include ignorance as
a necessary condition ''begs the question in favor of a strongly intellectualist accOlmt of virtue."'S
UA has attracted few supporters, but is important because it, as well as
alternative secular accounts, places humility in an evaluative context. Even
though the modest person on Driver's account is ignorant of her true
worth, she only counts as modest because there is an accurate eva luation of
her worth that she fails consistently to make but that others can conceivably make. Tn other words, "this analysis of modesty ... entails that an
asymmetry exists between the self-ascription of the virtue and the otherascription of it. I can ascribe the virtue to another, but I cannot coherently
and sincerely ascribe it to myself."'6
The primary criticism of UA in the subsequent literature has been that
Driver's analysis "is inconsistent with some important ethical beliefs which
we hold to be true."I? First, to suppose that a dogmatic disposition toward
ignorance concerning one's true worth is productive of virtue in any sense
is counterintuitive. We believe ignorance and self-deception to be moral
defects; to imagine that tl,ere is class of virtues that requires such states is
paradoxical, to say the least. Second, UA makes it impossible for a person
to be deliberately modest, since ignorance is a necessary condition for
modesty. This would make it impossible to cultivate or even to desire to
cultivate modesty, since "surely one cannot consciously form false beliefs
about oneself."'s Finally, it very well may be that such a disposition toward
ignorance concerning self-worth would be productive of far more undesirable than desirable states of affairs, situations in which the modest or humble person would be disposed toward servility, feelings of inferiority, and
general ignorance concerning one's worth as a human being. For all of
these reasons, the general consensus in the literature has been that UA is
reduced to absurdity by its reliance on ignorance. l ,)
The primary alternative secular account of humility, proposed by Owen
Flanagan, is the non overestimation account (NA).2l1 According to this formulation, "the modest person may well have a perfectly accurate sense of her
accomplishments and worth, but she does not overestimate them."21 The
attraction of this position is that it appears to solve the logical puzzle concerning humility raised previously as well as avoiding the various counterintuitive implications of UA. While Driver's modest person believes she is
truthful in her estimation of her own worth but is actually ignorant of the
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real truth, the modest or humble person according to NA both knows the
truth and incorporates it accurately into her self-evaluation, since according to this account "there is no need for the modest person to be ignorant
of her worth and accomplishments ... modesty and realism in selfappraisal are perfectly compatible."22 Furthermore, NA does not require
that modesty or humility be involuntary. While Driver's modest person
cannot consciously strive to be modest, flanagan's can.
The voluntary nature of modesty according to NA reveals some important underlying features of this account. Although there may be persons
who systematically underestimate their value in the sense required by UA,
Flanagan argues that such persons are anomalous. The far greater problem
in the context of self-evaluation is to overestimate one's value. Hence, NA
modesty requires simply that one "learn not to overestimate one's accomplishment and worth," since most of us are "immodest overestimators."23
These considerations provide support for our intuitions that "what we
need is not more people who underestimate their self-worth [UA], but
more people who do not overestimate their worth and accomplishments
[NA]."24 Although subsequent writers find fault with various aspects of
NA, Hare clearly has it in mind when he summarizes recent work on modesty and humility as "promising new attempts to give a more positive and
central role to humility as a secular virtue ... as a quality of making accurate self-assessments, often with special emphasis on non-overestimation
(as opposed to underestimation) of one's merits. 25
Although NA is an improvement on UA for the above reasons, both
accounts share the fundamental assumption that modesty /humility is to
be understood, oddly enough, as primarily self-referential. For reasons I
discuss below, this assumption arises from a deep commitment to a naturalistic metaphysics that excludes by definition anything transcendent;
hence, the insistence that humility must be a "secular" virtue if it is to be a
virtue at all. This commitment causes all virtues, even those such as humility whose core energy is largely directed away from the self, to be essentially centered on the self. A brief consideration of problems that have been
raised concerning NA will shed light on these larger problems that arise
from the attempt to define humility in naturalistic terms.
According to Flanagan, "the modest person sees more dearly than most
how the base rates work."26 What, however, are the "base rates," and on
what basis does Flanagan assume that these "rates" locate an individual's
value at a lower point than the non-modest individual generally does?
Flanagan does not directly answer this question, but, as will be shown
below, the critical analysis of other commentators suggests that in order
for NA to work, the "base rates" must first be egalitarian and, second, must
locate human worth as relatively low in the overall scheme of things. NA,
in other words, must be supplemented with at least two additional principles, both of which turn out to be problematic within a naturalistic framework.
First, Ben-Ze'ev argues that NA must be supplemented by some sort of
egalitarian evaluative principle. Without a supplemental principle that
establishes "the fundamental similar worth of all human beings," "we may
estimate our worth accurately but still be immodest in the sense that we con-
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sider other people inferior to US."27 all the time being modest according to
NA. This, of course, requires that some argument be provided for why the
"base rates" must be egalitarian. Most of the authors under consideration
indicate that they are, but do not agree on the justification of why they are. 28
The second problem with NA arises upon further investigation of the NA
claim that a person of truly worthy character and accomplishments can still be
modest or humble because she will keep her accomplishments "in perspective." "In perspective," as understood by Flanagan, means to resist the temptation to overestimate one's value, the temptation to locate the "base rates" mentioned earlier at a higher level than one should. Daniel Statman observes,
however, that this only makes sense if one assumes that human value is, comparatively speaking, pretty low. 29 Otherwise, the person of truly worthy
accomplishments, accurately assessing her value according to NA, would still
present herself as superior to others, contradicting the general conception of
humility. Schueler suggests that the advocate of NA must "implicitly add an
assumption to the effect that an accurate view of one's accomplishments,
skills, merits, or whatever, will always reveal a relatively low opinion to be the
correct one ... The most obvious problem is that this assumption might just be
false for some people and some accomplishments."3o
If it is truly the case that human value is comparatively low, then it is
understandable how accurate self-assessment can lead to humility. How,
though, might such an assumption be justified? Both Statman and Schueler
point out that a low-value assessment of human worth is entirely consistent
with the Jewish and Christian religious traditions. 31 If one is willing to accept a
"pessimistic" view of human nature, then NA makes a great deal of sense. The
problem is that if NA only makes sense as part of a "religious" framework,
NA no longer is a "secular" account of modesty and humility. The framework
needed in order for NA to make sense is precisely the framework that must be
rejected in any attempt to give a naturalistic account ofhumility.32
The problems raised with NA, then, are that (1) some principle of fundamental human equality must be added and justified in order for the
"base rates" to be accurate, and that (2) NA implicitly assumes that human
value is comparatively low, an assumption that can only be justified from a
"Christian" or "religious" standpoint that is no longer relevant and is out
of place in an attempt to give a "secular" account of modesty and humility.
Problem (1) concerns the comparison of individuals with each other, while
(2) addresses the overall collective value of human beings in the larger
scheme of things. In the sections that follow, I use the work of Iris Murdoch
and Simone Weil to address these problems in reverse order, arguing that
neither problem can be solved satisfactorily on a naturalistic basis. True
humility must be understood within a context that includes the transcendent; only within this context can the analysis of humility escape the naturalistic, self-referential limitations that characterize the recent literature.

II.

Humility is not a peculiar habit of self-effacement . .. It is a selfless respect
for reality and one of the most difficult and central of virtues.
Iris Murdoch 33
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The recent philosophical literature has attempted to "secularize" humility
by defining it in terms of accurate self-assessment, with an emphasis on
resisting the overestimation of one's worth. As shown in the previous section, however, this definition arguably requires additional supporting
assumptions that violate the nahlralistic framework within which the secularizing is going on. Schlesinger suggests that these problems arise because
of a fundamental error concerning the nature of humility.
I believe that the assertion of any false or true statements about one's
worth and accomplishments, or the harboring of correct or incorrect
beliefs about them, plays no substantial role in determining the
degree of humility an individual may exemplify. Instead, humility is
a function of the attitudes a person has toward certain facts and of the
significance he attaches to them. It has to do with what an individual's attention is focused upon. 34
I agree that "secular" humility is not humility at all, because naturalized
humility is focused first and foremost on the self. Rather, humility is directed away from oneself and is a virtue that arises from a recognition of and
athmement to a reality that is other and greater than oneself. In this section, I argue that such a virtue cannot be accounted for on exclusively naturalistic assumptions and suggest ways in which transcendence might be
reintroduced into the discussion of humility without immediately adopting the "religious" framework that contemporary work in humility is so
critical of.
Much of Iris Murdoch's later philosophical work focuses on the crisis
arising from the decline of religion and the increasing influence of the naturalistic framework that lies at the core of contemporary science. Although
she is not a religious (Christian or otherwise) thinker in the traditional
sense, she insists that the apparent decline of traditional religious constructs must not blind us to the necessity of preserving the morally crucial
features of transcendence and "otherness" that are definitive of these
frameworks. 35 In "Against Dryness," she writes that "We need more concepts than our philosophies have furnished us with. We need to be enabled
... to picture, in a non-metaphysical, non-totalitarian and non-religious
sense, the transcendence of reality."36 Thus enabled, Murdoch's moral hero
is the "mystical hero" who
is the man who has given up traditional religion but is still haunted
by a sense of the reality and unity of some sort of spirihlal world ....
The virtue of the mystical hero is humility ... [the mystical hero] is
the new version of the man of faith, believing in goodness without
religious guarantees, guilty, muddled, yet not without hope. This
image consoles by showing us man as frail, godless, and yet possessed of genuine intuitions of an authoritative good. 37
Murdoch specifies humility as the primary virtue of the mystical hero
because, contrary to recent characterizations of humility, she identifies
humility as the virtue most characteristic of the person who resists the ten-
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dency to believe that she is "the measure of all things" and turns her energy and concern outward. Murdoch describes such a person in the final
lines of The Sovereignty of Good.
Humility is a rare virtue and an unfashionable one and one which is
often hard to discern. Only rarely does one meet somebody in whom
it positively shines, in whom one apprehends with amazement the
absence of the anxious avaricious tentacles of the self ... Names of
virtues suggest directions of thought, and this direction seems to me
a better one than that suggested by more popular concepts such as
freedom and courage. The humble man, because he sees himself as
nothing, can see other things as theyare. 38
Although Murdoch does suggest that "ultimately we are nothing" and that
an awareness of this brings us "closer to the deep mystery of being
human,"39 she does not introduce this at the outset as a dogmatic formula.
Rather, her characterization of humility begins at a point similar to
Flanagan's when he observes that human beings tend by nature to value
themselves more highly than they should.
Murdoch observes that we are fully convinced that we are "the measure
of all things;""U this delusion blinds us to the fact that consideration of our
own experience and the world around us with even the slightest amount of
care reveals something entirely different. "We are continually confronting
something other than ourselves ... We all, not only can but have to, experience and deal with a transcendent reality, the resistant otherness of other
persons, other things, history, the natural world, the cosmos, and this
involves perpetual effort."4l To use a phrase and concept that Murdoch
borrows from Simone Weil, this effort requires the turning of one's attention away from what we most naturally attend to, ourselves."2 "The direction of attention is, contrary to nature, outward, away from self which
reduces all to a false unity, towards the great surprising variety of the
world."43 Arguably, the attempts to define humility in secular terms discussed in the first section fail to require this redirection of the attention.
Our human tendency to place ourselves at the center of reality is not
ultimately replaced in Murdoch's analysis by a cognitive and evaluative
activity simply directed toward others rather than oneself. Humility
requires a transformation of orientation that is far more attitudinal than
cognitive. Weil speaks of "an orientation of the soul towards something
which one does not know, but whose reality one does know ... I turn my
attention towards this thing about which I know simply that it is, but about
which I haven't the least idea what it is."'" What is transcendent, what is
other, is always in some sense beyond us; this is why "it is a task to come to
see the world as it is"45 and why it is much more natural to remain primarily focused on oneself.
It is one thing to say that human beings are not "the measure of all
things;" it is another thing, however, to claim that human beings do not
count for much in the ultimate scheme of things. One of the primary criticisms of NA, specified in Part I, was that NA implicitly requires the belief
that overall human value is low, a belief that makes it impossible for per-
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sons of true accomplishments and value to be humble. The criticism further
suggests that this belief is most appropriate in the context of a traditionally
religious perspective such as Judaism or Christianity. As noted above,
Murdoch claims that we "ultimately are nothing," and Weil's seemingly
low opinion of at least her own value runs throughout her notebooks and
published writings. Apart from the "religious" framework that contemporary investigators of humility reject, what reason is there to believe this?
Although one need not adopt the limited and pessimistic framework
described by Richards at the beginning of this essay in order to conclude
that human value is comparatively low in the ultimate scheme of things,
such a conclusion does require a metaphysical framework within which
the gap between the contingency of human existence and the absolute
nature of values such as truth and goodness can be recognized. Humility
in Murdoch's sense requires a turning of one's attention outward.
Although this movement of the attention is most often toward other contingent things, such as other persons, works of art, or the beauty of the
world, such a movement is ultimately energized by the natural human
longing for what is not merely contingent. 46 If we "pay attention," we experience fully the attraction of what is most important but is most unlike us.
The supreme principle or absolute, the certain unfailing pure source
and perfect object of love is not and cannot be an existing thing (or
person) and is separate from, though magnetically connected with
contingent "stuff" however thought of in some contexts as fundamental"?
Persons who seek the truth about themselves are "magnetized by an independent transcendent multiform reality,"4s a reality of which they are only a
small, contingent part. An important element of true humility is the awareness of the "fragility" and contingency of all aspects of the human being.
There is nothing that cannot be broken or taken from us. Ultimately
we are nothing. A reminder of our mortality, a recognition of contingency, must at least make us humble. Are we not then closer to the
deep mystery of being human? ... Of course one's persona or selfprotective personality or "life illusion" is part of one's working gear
as a human being; yet, as we are occasionally given to perceive, it is
extremely fragile. Anyone can be destroyed. 49
The assumptions underlying this perspective need not be "religious" in
the traditional sense, but they are at significant odds with the naturalistic
metaphysics within which contemporary analyses of humility are situated.
One of my themes to this point has been that these contemporary discussions cannot accommodate humility as "the root of all authentic virtues"50
because humility cannot be properly understood as a "secular" virtue, if
"secular" requires the elimination of the transcendent. Humility requires a
fundamental awareness of the transcendence of reality, a transcendence
within which in some strange way contingent creatures such as ourselves
"live and move and have our being."
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There's no secret knowledge, no complete explanation, we must be
humble and simple and see what we know and respect what we
don't know. Man is not the measure of all things, we don't just invent
our values, we live by a higher law, yet we can't fully explain how
this is so. '1
III.

Humility of a really high order is something unknown to us. We cannot
even conceive such a thing possible.
- Simone Wei!"
One of the primary problems raised with the NA account of humility is
that it implicitly assumes that human value is low, an assumption requiring placement within a "Christian" or "religious" metaphysical framework
that is no longer relevant and is contrary to any attempt to provide a "secular" account of modesty and humility. In the previous section, I used the
work of Iris Murdoch to argue that such a belief concerning human value
can be reached without assumptions that would be characterized as traditionally "religious," but that a meaningful conception of humility does
require a metaphysical framework including the transcendent, a framework that leads precisely to the assumption concerning overall human
value that contemporary investigators of humility are most wary of. In this
final section, I consider another problem raised with NA, that it requires a
supplemental principle of human equality. Any meaningful account of
humility does indeed require belief in such a principle, but the principle is
difficult to establish on a naturalistic basis. I use the work of Simone Weil
to show that such a principle can only be fully justified in the context of
precisely that "transcendent" framework that secular accounts of humility
seek to avoid."
Human beings not only tend to overrate their collective value in comparison to other existing things, but also regularly rank themselves individually as superior in value to their fellow human beings. Since "the basic
evaluative belief involved in modesty concerns the fundamental similar
worth of all human beings,"54 any account of modesty or humility must
show why all persons should be considered as equal in worth, despite the
natural human tendency to rate oneself higher than others. Indeed, one of
the primary texts concerning humility in the Gospels indicates that it is
precisely the refusal to rank oneself in comparison to others that is at the
heart of true humility. In response to the disciples' question "Who then is
greatest in the kingdom of heaven?", Jesus draws their attention to a little
child and says "unless you become as little children, you will by no means
enter the kingdom of heaven. Therefore whoever humbles himself as this
little child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven."55 How, then, is one to
become "as little children" and resist the natural tendency to care about
one's rank in comparison with others?
In her Notebooks, Simone Weil provides a practical discussion of how
this might occur. She begins by observing "Humility; believing oneself to
be beneath others. This in itself does not make any sense."'" Why should
humility require that one believe oneself to be beneath others, rather than
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simply requiring that one not believe oneself to be above others? Weil
explains that she defines humility in this way in order to bring about an
evaluative equilibrium.
One must believe oneself to be beneath others in order to bring oneself round to the point where one regards oneself as their equal and
does not prefer oneself. Since it is impossible to prevent oneself from
imagining a hierarchical order, a ladder amongst human beings, one
must place oneself on the lowest rung so as to avoid being situated
above any other human being in one's own estimation. By dint of
maintaining oneself on the lowest rung, the ladder disappears. 57
Just as Descartes proposed to deny what he believed to be true in order to
bring himself to the point that he could doubt it, Weil suggests that humility can be fostered if one believes oneself to be beneath others in order to
come to the place that one no longer considers oneself above others. This, of
course, can also facilitate the turning of the attention away from oneself
that is fundamental to humility, as considered in the previous section.
This, however, does not explain why one should consider all human
beings as fundamentally equal. What of those who are truly superior to
others? On what basis and for what reasons should they refuse to acknowledge their superiority and treat their inferiors as equals? As noted earlier,
although contemporary writers on humility generally agree that some sort
of principle of human equality is needed, they disagree concerning the
basis for and justification of this principle. Weil addresses this problem in
her essay" Are We Struggling for Justice?", arguing that "it is not doctrines, conceptions, inclinations, intentions, wants, which thus transform
the mechanism of human thought. For this madness is needed."sR
Weil begins this essay by drawing our attention to Thucydides' famous
story of the Athenians and the Melians during the Peloponnesian War. 59
The Athenians scoff at the Melians' call for fair play and equal treatment,
because the Athenians are entirely in a position of power. Equal consideration and treatment is only required between equals: "The examination of
what is just is carried out only when there is equal necessity on each side.
Where there is one who is strong and one who is weak, the possible is done
by the first and accepted by the second."60 According to the Athenians,
there is no reason that they should treat the Melians fairly, because "by a
necessity of nature each one always commands wherever he has the power
to do SO.//61 Similarly, it is unreasonable to dictate a priori that all humans
are of equal value, as humility requires. If a person is truly superior in
value or worth to others, then just as the Athenians would have been foolish to treat the Melians as equals when they obviously were not, it would
be foolish for the superior person to pretend that she is equal to her inferiors.
The story is familiar; what is of interest for present purposes is Weil's
conclusion that, on an exclusively human level, the Athenians are absolutely correct. As she writes elsewhere, "It is impossible to feel equal respect
for things that are in fact unequal unless the respect is given to something
that is identical in all of them. Men are unequal in all their relations with
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the things of this world, without exception." b2 There is, in other words, no
"secular" or "naturalistic" basis upon which true human equality can be
established. Common possession of reason and shared human experience
are insufficient to establish the needed principle, nor can it simply be
assumed axiomatically.
The Melian appeal to the self-interest of the Athenians was unsuccessful; how else might the Melians have tried to convince the Athenians to
treat unequals equally? Weil anachronistically provides them with an
argument from the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation: "Being in the state
of God, He did not regard equality with God as a prize .... He assumed
the state of slavery ... He humbled himself to the point of being made obedient unto death ... Even though He was the Son, what he suffered taught
Him obedience."63 Here is an example of what is truly of most value, the
Divine itself, choosing voluntarily to become equal to, even lower than,
those that are truly lower than itself. Well observes, however, that such an
argument would hardly have been convincing to the Athenians. "These
words could have been an answer to the Athenian murderers of Melos.
They would have really made them laugh. And rightly so. They are
absurd. They are mad."""
For Weit humility is lithe only entirely supernatural virtue" 65 because it
looks beyond the "natural" in seeking to lay the only possible foundation
for justice and human equality. What could cause a person to treat another person as an equal, when there is no "earthly" reason to do so? One
must seek for something in the other person that transcends the various
contingencies that establish hierarchies and inequality. Weit writing
toward the end of World War It observes that "mankind has become mad
from want of love." bb Such madness can be addressed only by another sort
of madness, a love that "once it has seized a human being, completely
transforms the modalities of action and thought." 6 ? Such love, as any love,
requires an object.
One needs above a11 something to love ... not through hating its
opposite, but in itself ... Something to love not for its glory, its prestige, its glitter, its conquests, its radiance, its future prospects, but for
itself ... What we need is something people can love naturally from
the depths of their hearts. 6s
In "Draft for a Statement of Human Obligations/' Well describes the
metaphysical framework within which one can locate the true source of
human equality.
There is a reality outside the world, that is to say, outside space and
time, outside man's mental universe, outside any sphere whatsoever
that is accessible to human faculties. Corresponding to this reality, at
the center of the human heart, is the longing for an absolute good, a
longing which is always there and is never appeased by any object in
this world. Just as the reality of this world is the sole foundation of
facts, so that other reality is the sole foundation of the good. That
reality is the unique source of all the good that can exist in this world:
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that is to say, all beauty, all truth, all justice, all legitimacy, all order,
and all human behavior that is mindful of obligations. Those minds
whose attention and love are turned towards that reality are the sole
intermediary through which good can descend from there and come
among men. Although it is beyond the reach of any human faculties,
man has the power of turning his attention and love towards it. 69
Weil is here describing within a detailed metaphysical context the same
dynamic described by Murdoch when she writes that "we yearn for the
transcendent, for God, for something divine and good and pure,"?n even
though we do not know with any specificity what this other reality is.?1 The
task of the humble person is to turn his or her attention toward this reality,
with the conviction that such attention will not go unrewarded. "To anyone who does actually consent to directing his attention and love beyond
the world, towards the reality that exists outside the reach of all human
faculties, it is given to succeed in doing SO."72
Weillocates the true basis of human equality in the human capacity to
seek for and believe in the efficacy of what is greater than oneself.
The combination of these two facts-the longing in the depth of the
heart for absolute good, and the power, though only latent, of directing attention and love to a reality beyond the world and of receiving
good from it-constitutes a link which attaches every man without
exception to that other reality. Whoever recognizes that reality recognizes also that link. Because of it, he holds every human being without any exception as something sacred to which he is bound to show
respect. This is the only possible motive for universal respect towards
all human beings?3
The object of the love required to establish the equality of all persons
despite their contingent differences is precisely this capacity, equal in all
persons, to attend to what transcends contingency.
The only thing that is identical in all men is the presence of a link
with the reality outside the world. All human beings are absolutely
identical insofar as they can be thought of as consisting of a center,
which is an unquenchable desire for good, surrounded by an accretion of physical and bodily matter?'
This is why Weil reminds herself in her Notebooks "to accord value in
myself only to what is transcendent;"?" only in the context of what is transcendent can the natural human tendency to value oneself more highly
than others be countered by attention to what is truly of value in all persons?6 This, in turn, makes justice and equality, the natural fruits of humility, possible.
Anyone whose attention and love are really directed towards the
reality outside the world recognizes at the same time that he is
bound, both in public and private life, by the single and permanent
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obligation to remedy, according to his responsibilities and to the
extent of his power, all the privations of soul and body which are
liable to destroy or damage the earthly life of any human being whatsoever.77
Humility as described by Murdoch and Weil does not necessarily carry
the additional characteristics of the "religious" frameworks that are of so
much concern in contemporary discussions of humility. Their conceptions
of humility, however, provide evidence that humility cannot be properly
accounted for without a metaphysical framework that transcends naturalism, a framework whose details can be specified in a variety of ways. This
is but one illustration of moral growth as "a progressive revelation of
something which exists independently of me," in which "attention is
rewarded by a knowledge of reality.fl 78
Life is a spirihlal pilgrimage inspired by the disturbing magnetism of
truth, involving ipso facto a purification of energy and desire in the
light of a vision of what is good. The good and just life is thus a
process of clarification, a movement toward selfless lucidity, guided
by ideas of perfection which are objects of love. 79
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